Legislating Chevron by Garrett, Elizabeth
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers
2003
Legislating Chevron
Elizabeth Garrett
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that
a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Garrett, "Legislating Chevron" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 44, 2003).
CHICAGO 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 44 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGISLATING CHEVRON 
 
Elizabeth Garrett 
 
 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
April 2003 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html  
and at The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=393161  
Forthcoming: 101 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2003) 
Symposium on Judging Judicial Review: Marbury in the Modern Era 
 
 
 
 
Legislating Chevron 
 
Elizabeth Garrett* 
 
 
 One of the most significant administrative law cases, Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,1 is routinely referred to as “the counter-Marbury.”2 The 
reference suggests that Chevron’s command to courts to defer to certain reasonable 
agency interpretations of statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with the declaration in 
Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”3 According to the consensus view, Chevron deference 
is consistent with Marbury, as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the power to 
make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling gaps in regulatory 
laws.4 In saying what the law is, the courts determine that the law demands deference to 
the agency’s decision. As Henry Monaghan wrote before Chevron: “A statement that 
judicial deference is mandated to an administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more 
appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Southern California. I 
appreciate very helpful comments from Rachel Barkow, Jody Freeman, Andrei Marmor, Eric Posner, Cass 
Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule, and conversations with Linda Cohen, Barry Friedman, Dennis Hutchinson, 
and Jim Rossi. 
1 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2 For perhaps the first such reference, see Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2075 (1990). See also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore 
Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1105, 1108 (2001) (stating that Chevron has 
“taken on canonical status as the ‘counter-Marbury’ for the administrative state”). 
3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
4 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 863 (2001); 
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 215 (2002); 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced 
Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 746-47 (2002). A very few scholars resist the notion that 
congressional delegation can solve the Marbury problem apparently caused when courts are not the 
primary interpreters of the law. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 477 (1989). See also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial 
Control of Administrative Action 563 (1965) (twenty years before Chevron, discussing judicial deference 
to agency interpretations and noting that the propriety of the practice “assumes, of course, that under our 
system of law an agency may not only apply rules, but may make them”). This symposium will no doubt 
shed new light on this debate. 
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authority has been conferred upon the agency.”5 His use of the passive tense here could 
obscure one important part of his formulation: It is Congress that has conferred such 
lawmaking power on the agencies; thus, judicial deference stems from an understanding 
that it is emphatically the province and duty of the legislative department to determine 
whether agencies or the courts should determine policy by interpreting statutes. 
Congressional delegation is not important just to reconcile modern administrative law 
with Marbury; it is also the reason provided by courts to justify strong deference to 
agency interpretations of law. Chevron held that 
[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. … Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.6 
 
Although it cut back on the scope of Chevron, United States v. Mead7 underscored that 
strong judicial deference is a product of either an explicit or implicit delegation by 
Congress.8 In the first part of this article, I will discuss the various ways courts have 
reached decisions about the delegation issue and provide a brief assessment of them. 
In the end, none of the judicial methods to determine whether Congress actually 
delegated law-interpreting authority to agencies can satisfactorily achieve that objective. 
Without explicit congressional direction regarding which institution, courts or agencies, 
should have the primary role in interpreting statutes, the institutional choice is necessarily 
made by courts when they decide cases that require such interpretation. Although they 
tend to justify their decisions by reference to congressional intent, in the absence of such 
intent or without effective methods to ascertain it, the judicial branch decides whether or 
not to defer to agencies based on judges’ views of policy, institutional competence, and 
other factors. Some scholars have argued that, if the decision has been effectively left to 
the courts, judges should devise and consistently apply a general rule of construction of 
                                                 
5 Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1983). See also John 
H. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 
96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 621-22, 627 (1996) (using Monaghan’s analysis to reconcile Marbury and 
Chevron). 
6 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
7 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
8 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
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regulatory statutes based on an explicit consideration of the institutional capacities of the 
courts and agencies.9 Recourse to congressional intent is inevitably unavailing, the 
argument goes, so courts should more transparently base their approach on other factors. 
My project in this article is not to argue in favor of a particular rule of judicial 
review but rather to focus on a feature common to all of them. Whether courts search for 
some direction from Congress or whether they allocate interpretive authority based on 
other factors, all the methods of judicial review provide that a clear congressional 
instruction overrides any judicial rule. As Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman explain: 
The conclusion that Chevron rests on an implied delegation from Congress … has 
important implications for Chevron’s domain: It means that Congress has ultimate 
authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine, and that courts should attend 
carefully to the signals Congress sends about its interpretative wishes.10 
 
Similarly, those who argue in favor of a consistently-applied interpretive regime based on 
institutional, nonintentionalist grounds anticipate that “clear instructions of Congress”11 
can vary the effect of the default. Why hasn’t Congress more often taken advantage of 
this power to signal its intentions clearly? Does its silence allow us to assume that 
Congress virtually always agrees with the judicial approach in these cases? Are the 
procedural hurdles faced by Congress in passing legislation with clear directives to courts 
and agencies so formidable that the opt-out features in all the judicial approaches are 
illusory?12 Are we sufficiently confident that Congress has a realistic opportunity to 
communicate clearly when it wishes to depart from whatever approach the courts are 
currently applying? If the opt-out feature of all these methods of judicial review is not a 
real option for Congress, then the emphasis put on the possibility of congressional 
involvement in justifying an approach or in constructing a default rule is misplaced at 
best, and serves as deceptive and confusing window-dressing at worst. 
                                                 
9 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2003) 
(forthcoming) (arguing in favor of an institutional approach). 
10 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 836. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead 
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L . Rev. 807, 823 (2002) 
(explaining that “Christiansen [v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)] and Mead make it clear that 
Congress has the authority to turn Chevron deference on and off”). 
11 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, supra note 9, at ___. 
12 See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 101 Mich. L. Rev. ___, [11] (2003) (noting that 
what he calls “provisional review” may not be “provisional in practice” if Congress cannot overcome 
hurdles to legislating different instructions). 
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To the extent that anyone mentions the possibility of greater congressional 
involvement,13 it is quickly dismissed because Congress seldom provides explicit 
instructions allocating this sort of policymaking authority and because it is seen as 
unrealistic to expect that Congress will improve its performance.14 In the second part of 
this article, I describe a mechanism that could provide Congress an opportunity to 
provide explicit instructions about law-interpreting authority. Low expectations for 
congressional performance stem in part from a failure to think creatively about the kinds 
of legislative vehicles available to Congress and about internal rules that can structure its 
deliberation. Past discussions assume that Congress could signal its delegation decision in 
one of two ways. First, Congress could pass a broad statute that would allocate the law-
interpreting function either to agencies or courts with respect to all statutes unless 
subsequent laws vary the default rule. Arguably, Section 706 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act15 is a broad statement delegating that authority to courts, contrary to the 
rule adopted in Chevron.16 Alternatively, Congress could make the decision with respect 
to each statute, perhaps also amending previously enacted statutes that are silent on the 
issue. 
I suggest that Congress has another way to communicate its choice among 
institutions. In statutes that periodically re-authorize administrative agencies and large 
federal programs or that annually appropriate funds to agencies, Congress could 
determine on an agency-by-agency basis whether to delegate the power to make policy 
through statutory interpretation with respect to all statutes that the agency administers, or 
                                                 
13 Merrill briefly discusses this option, considering both the possibility that Congress might pass a broad 
statute or that it would provide instructions statute-by-statute. See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at 
824-25. 
14 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 203, 227. 
15 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
16 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and 
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1239, 1249 
(2002) (reading section 706 as an express congressional affirmation of “judicial power over law 
declaration”). But see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 871 (“Chevron deference 
is consistent with the APA’s direction to courts to decide all relevant questions of law because virtually all 
the statutes that reflect an implicit delegation of interpretational authority either postdate the APA or have 
been reenacted since its passage. … In effect, every time Congress has made an implied delegation to an 
administrative agency, it has silently amended section 706 of the APA.”). Michael Herz disputes Merrill 
and Hickman’s suggested reading of section 706 and Chevron, noting that the APA states that no 
subsequent statute can supersede or modify the APA unless it does so expressly. See Michael Herz, 
Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1663, 1664-65 
(1992) (citing section 559 of the APA). 
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with respect to some subset of decisions. Congress could define that subset using a 
procedural metric, as the Court appears to do in Mead, or on some other basis. The 
congressional decision could be based on the variety of factors, including those identified 
by courts and others as relevant to whether a delegation of law-interpreting authority to 
agencies makes sense. In particular, Congress could assess the performance of each 
agency and judge whether it is the best entity to make the policy decisions inherent in 
interpreting vague or ambiguous statutory language. Congress would also have the ability 
to revise its determination over time as it re-assessed agency performance. 
This proposal is designed to take seriously the feature of judicial review of 
regulatory statutes that contemplates the possibility of an active role for Congress. There 
are two decisions in the context of regulatory policy that require choices between 
institutions. First, either Congress or the judiciary has to decide which governance 
institution has the primary responsibility for shaping regulatory policy through statutory 
interpretation. This decision implicates the design and authority of administrative 
agencies; it is a decision that determines the contours of the policymaking process over 
time. In part because of the tension between modern regulatory precedents and Marbury17 
and in part because the decision to vest an institution with law-interpreting authority is 
such a vital aspect of policymaking, the various proposals for judicial review provide 
Congress the first opportunity to make the choice of interpreters. But if Congress does 
not fill this role for some reason, the courts must decide whether to interpret the statute 
themselves or defer to reasonable agency views. Which institution is the primary 
interpreter is thus the second institutional choice decision, and it can be made on various 
grounds, all of which are better suited for consideration by Congress but which are not 
impossible for courts to assess and apply. 
In this complex interplay among the various government players, we could be 
more confident that Congress actually has the capacity to intervene occasionally, or even 
frequently, if a procedural framework made the issue more salient to lawmakers when 
they decided other similar issues of regulatory design. To put it more bluntly, if we want 
to pay more than lip service to the notion that Congress might be a vital player in 
                                                 
17 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 
513-14 (discussing the tension between modern administrative law approaches and Marbury). 
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decisions to allocate interpretive authority to other institutions, we should think seriously 
about procedures that could empower legislators in this realm. If we decide that actual 
congressional involvement will never or only rarely occur, even with new action-
prompting procedures, then our attention would be better focused on developing judicial 
strategies to allocate interpretive authority without reference to congressional intentions. 
 
I. Discovering—or Constructing—Congressional Intent to Delegate 
 
 The traditional challenge presented by the interaction of Chevron and Marbury is 
to determine in a particular case whether Congress actually has delegated law-
interpreting power to an agency. There are occasional explicit delegations, just as there 
are sometimes specific statutory provisions revealing that Congress has determined that 
courts should interpret statutory terms without any enhanced attention to the agency’s 
views.18 Such explicit instructions may have once occurred more frequently than they do 
now. Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts reveal that in the first half of the 
twentieth century, Congress followed a drafting convention to signal that it intended to 
authorize agencies to act with the force of law, a power that included the ability to 
interpret ambiguous language and fill statutory gaps. Pursuant to this convention, when 
Congress delegated to an agency the authority to adopt rules and regulations with a 
specific provision authorizing it to impose sanctions for violations of such rules, Merrill 
and Watts argue that Congress intended agencies to act with “force of law.”19 The courts 
failed to pick up on this coded signal,20 but the congressional convention may 
demonstrate that the legislature has sometimes considered the delegation issue and 
reached a conclusion, albeit one cryptically conveyed. 
                                                 
18 For cases dealing with explicit delegations to agencies, see United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 
U.S. 16, 24 (1981); Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1981); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 
247, 253 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1976); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 
44 (1981); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 613-14 (1944). Barron and Kagan 
provide an example of Congress’ explicitly instructing courts to determine interpretive issues “without 
unequal deference” to the agency view. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 216 n.58 
(citing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, enacted in 1999). 
19 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original 
Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 503-26 (2002). 
20 Id. at 475. 
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Nonetheless, express congressional instructions are rare, so in most cases a court 
must work to determine if there has been an implicit delegation. The cases reveal various 
approaches to this question, some that are more rule-like in nature, and others that rely on 
more open-textured standards. Courts have moved between the two approaches, currently 
resting somewhere in the middle. Moreover, even when courts have adopted a relatively 
bright-line rule apparently requiring deference to agencies in many circumstances, in 
practice judges have often resisted deferring to agency interpretations, deciding instead 
that the statutory language clearly compels only one result. In the absence of explicit 
congressional communication, any quest for congressional intent may obscure what is 
actually occurring: the judiciary is determining whether to defer to an agency 
interpretation without any guidance, implicit or otherwise, from Congress. 
 Although courts deferred to some agency interpretations of statutes before 
Chevron,21 the basis for deference was not entirely clear and often seemed to rest on the 
agency’s power to persuade the court that its interpretation, a product of its expertise, was 
the best understanding of vague or ambiguous language. Chevron can be understood as 
adopting a rule-like presumption that statutory silence or ambiguity should be read as an 
implicit delegation to agencies. The rule-like quality of Chevron was in part a reaction to 
the complex, multifactor approach to judicial deference used in the pre-Chevron era.22 By 
providing a clear default rule that all cases of statutory ambiguity would be understood as 
a delegation to the agency to determine the meaning of the text, Chevron attempted to 
provide certainty and predictability for Congress, agencies and the regulated. The most 
enthusiastic proponent of Chevron as an across-the-board presumption, Justice Scalia, did 
not argue that it would capture actual congressional intent in many, or even most cases.23 
Indeed, as a textualist, Scalia is not particularly concerned with congressional intent in 
any context, expressing strong doubts that it is a coherent concept.24 Instead, he 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See also id. at 130 (at least suggesting 
that part of the reason for deference to the Board should be whether Congress “entrusted” the relevant 
decision to the agency). 
22 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 562-67 
(1985) (discussing factors used). 
23 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 517. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 406, 445 (1989) (“An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-
interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.”). 
24 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 16-18 (1997). 
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maintained that “any rule adopted in this field merely represents a fictional, presumed 
intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can 
legislate.”25 
The connection between Chevron’s presumption and actual congressional wishes 
is further undermined because the presumption has been applied to all regulatory statutes, 
not just those passed after the Court changed its approach from a multifactor analysis to a 
strong presumption. For statutes enacted before 1984, including the Clean Air Act 
provision at issue in Chevron, Congress could not be presumed to have relied on the 
default rule and therefore used ambiguity to signal its delegation of law-interpreting 
authority to agencies. Notwithstanding the lack of connection between the presumption 
and an actual congressional intent to delegate in many contexts, proponents argue that the 
rule allows for certainty in the future. If the rule is applied consistently, Congress can 
draft statutes in reliance on the default regime.26 Thus, if Congress is silent about which 
institution has the primary responsibility for interpreting unclear statutory text, the 
legislature can be fairly understood as intending that agencies to fulfill that role. In 
addition, an across-the-board presumption offers the promise of reducing judicial 
decision costs. In theory, a bright-line rule that ambiguity or silence results in deference, 
absent congressional instructions to the contrary, is easy for judges to apply, particularly 
compared to a multifactor standard. Finally, use of the rule has been justified because any 
errors (measured against the baseline of what Congress intended) occur in favor of 
policymaking by a more democratically accountable institution, the executive branch, 
rather than by the insulated, unelected and life-tenured judicial branch.27 
 Chevron’s rule-like quality has caused substantial unease for some judges and 
scholars, however, largely because of the doctrinal importance of congressional 
                                                 
25 Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 517. See also Mead, 533 U.S. at 313 (Scalia, dissenting) (arguing that 
the principle of Chevron is “rooted in a legal presumption of congressional intent, important to the division 
of powers” between the branches of government). 
26 See Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 517 (suggesting that for statutes enacted after the adoption of the 
Chevron presumption, congressional silence might fairly be read as a delegation to an agency to provide 
meaning for vague or ambiguous terms). 
27 See, e.g., John F. Manning, supra note 5, at 627 (“Chevron adopts a background presumption that 
reconciles now firmly established conceptions of delegation with constitutional structure. It is more 
consistent with the assumptions of our constitutional system to vest discretion in more expert, 
representative, and accountable administrative agencies.”). 
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delegation.28 For many, the key question remained whether Chevron led to deference 
only, or even mainly, in cases where Congress actually delegated interpretive power to 
the agencies, or whether the rule was over-inclusive, requiring judicial deference even in 
cases where Congress had no intent or would have preferred a more aggressive judicial 
stance.29 Moreover, in practice, Chevron has not provided a certain background regime 
against which Congress can act, a factor which may undermine any legislative will to 
provide express directives. The scope of Chevron is unclear,30 and judges can avoid 
deferring to the agency interpretation if they find that statutory meaning is clear and 
unambiguous. By aggressively employing methods of statutory construction, courts 
decide cases at Step One of Chevron, thereby saying what the law is in the traditional 
sense and avoiding deference to reasonable agency understandings that the judges do not 
share.31 Scalia acknowledged that one reason he supports Chevron as an across-the-board 
presumption is that his method of interpretation allows him to resolve many cases at Step 
One and to avoid the distasteful prospect of accepting an agency view with which he 
disagrees.32 In addition, at Step Two a judge can avoid deferring to arguably reasonable 
interpretations by finding conflicts between the agency’s policy decision and the judge’s 
reading of the Act’s purposes or goals.33 
Several commentators have observed, after conducting various studies of the case 
law, that the effect of Chevron on judicial outcomes has not been as significant as one 
might have expected, although many found some increased level of judicial deference to 
                                                 
28 A rule like Chevron’s may be persuasively defended on grounds other than congressional delegation, a 
possibility I will discuss further infra, text at notes 68 through 71. 
29 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 470-71. 
30 Steven Croley, Scope of Chevron, available online at  
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc (5th Draft July 2001). Merrill observed 
recently that the Chevron rule has elements of a more open-textured standard, undermining the 
predictability that it promises, although it is more rule-like than the judicial approach before 1984 and than 
the one adopted in Mead. See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at 808-09, 818. 
31 See Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, paper prepared for 
the Scope of Judicial Review portion of the Project on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA’s 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section, Third Revised Draft June 2001 with Supplementary 
Material added February 2003 (assessing judicial practice applying Step One of Chevron). 
32 See Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 521. 
33 M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, available online at 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/abachevron1.doc (4th Draft July 2001). Levin has argued 
convincingly that many of these cases are really Step One cases although the statutory interpretation by the 
court is done when assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation. He terms such cases 
“belatedly discovered clean meaning” cases. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253, 1283-84 (1997). 
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agency interpretations.34 If Congress and interest groups are uncertain about the 
application of the judicial rule, crafting a legislative response is more difficult. 
Uncertainty about how Chevron will be applied has been exacerbated by uncertainty 
caused by the frequent shifts in the judicially-constructed background rule. It has never 
been entirely clear if all the justices shared Scalia’s view that Chevron operated as an 
across-the-board presumption, for example, and the majority opinion in Mead rejects 
such an understanding, claiming it an inaccurate portrayal of judicial practice.35 
 Given the doctrinally pivotal role of congressional delegations in legitimizing 
deferential judicial review, some have advocated that the courts work to discern in each 
case whether Congress intended, or would have intended, that the agency interpret 
unclear statutory language. Writing a few years after Chevron, then-Judge Breyer agreed 
with Scalia that congressional intent to delegate in these cases is a “kind of legal fiction” 
in that it is often constructed by courts without any explicit directive from the 
legislature.36 Breyer argued that courts should work to find implicit congressional intent 
by analyzing what a reasonable legislator would have intended with regard to the 
delegation issue, in light of all the practical circumstances surrounding the particular 
enactment. In other words, to reduce errors in the judicial determination of whether 
Congress wanted or would have wanted to delegate law-interpreting powers to an agency, 
courts should employ a multifactor approach reminiscent of the pre-Chevron analysis.37 
But this approach is not wholly satisfactory for those pursuing an intentionalist course, 
either. The use of such a standard imposes high decision costs on the judiciary, and even 
if judges use such an approach in a sophisticated manner, they may still misjudge 
                                                 
34 Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984 (1990); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the 
Chevron Puzzle, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 65 (1994); Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine 
in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. Env'l L.J. 398 (2000) (all finding some effect on deference attributable to 
Chevron). Compare with See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 
969, 970 (1992) (finding no “discernible relationship” between Chevron and greater deference and also 
considering the role of textualism during this period). All these findings are somewhat unsatisfying, and 
more suggestive than conclusive, because of limitations in the data. For example, after the adoption of a 
new approach became clear to litigants, the mix of cases reaching courts shifted as those who lost before 
agencies challenged only the decisions that they believed likely to be overturned. See also Peter H. Schuck 
& E. Donald Elliott, supra, at 995-96, 1060-61 (discussing limitations in data and study design but 
concluding that the analysis nonetheless shed light on important questions). 
35 Mead, 533 U.S. at 237-38. 
36 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986). 
37 Id. at 370-73. See also Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 528 (acknowledging difficulty for courts of a 
multifactor and nuanced approach but arguing that it is constitutionally compelled). 
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whether Congress intended, or would have intended, to delegate law interpretation to the 
agencies. 
 Recently, the Court has tried to resolve the disagreement by adopting a sort of 
middle ground. In Mead, the Court articulated a standard of judicial review that has both 
rule-like and standard-like components. The objective of the new approach is the same as 
the objective articulated in Chevron: to discover Congress’ intent as to which 
institution—courts or agencies—should make policy by interpreting ambiguous or vague 
statutory language.38 Mead holds that deference is appropriate when “Congress would 
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addressed ambiguity 
in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”39 To reach a conclusion that an agency 
has the power to regulate with the force of law, Mead appears to allow judges and 
agencies to rely on a safe harbor, holding that “it is fair to assume generally that Congress 
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively 
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force.”40 Thus, when an agency promulgates its 
statutory interpretation as part of notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, 
or formal rulemaking, courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous text because they should infer that Congress has delegated that authority to 
agencies when it accorded them the power to act through such procedures. 
If the choice of format entirely determined the level of deference and controlled 
the finding of implicit congressional delegations, Mead’s formulation would have the 
virtues of a relatively predictable rule, albeit one with a narrower scope than Chevron’s 
broad presumption. But the Court went on to say that “the want of that procedure does 
not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even 
when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”41 Thus, 
                                                 
38 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 479 (noting that Mead court “made 
clear that Chevron deference is grounded in a congressional intent to delegate primary interpretive 
authority to the agency”). 
39 Mead, 544 U.S. at 229. 
40 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. Merrill and Watts argue that the agency’s use of such procedures is itself not 
sufficient to allow a conclusion that Congress intended the agency to have the power to act with force of 
law. The determination of Congress’ intent should be a separate inquiry from the question whether the 
agency then used the procedures necessary to promulgate a regulation with legislative force. See Thomas 
W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 477-81. 
41 Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
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circumstances other than the formality of procedures authorized by Congress can give 
rise to deference because of delegation, but Mead provides little guidance about what 
those circumstances might be.42 In general, they would be factors suggesting that 
Congress intended the agency to act with force of law, an inference easily drawn, the 
Court says, when Congress allows agencies to use certain procedures to regulate, but also 
possible in other unspecified circumstances. 
 To the extent that Mead posits a general rule to discern implicit congressional 
intent, the link between the procedure authorized and the amount of law-interpreting 
authority delegated is not immediately clear. As Ronald Levin has observed, “If the 
notion that Congress regularly contemplates Chevron deference in passing regulatory 
legislation is a fiction, as it seems widely agreed, surely the notion that Congress 
regularly makes decisions about whether a given procedural format should trigger 
Chevron deference is even more of a fiction.”43 David Barron and Elena Kagan similarly 
argue that in some cases Congress may want courts to exercise independent and relatively 
aggressive judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes even when the 
interpretation is provided through formal procedures or notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Conversely, in some cases Congress may want “to give interpretive authority to an 
agency separate and apart from the power to issue rules or orders with independent legal 
effect on parties.”44 The point is that Mead’s safe harbor is not necessarily an accurate 
proxy for congressional delegation to agencies, although perhaps it is a tighter fit than the 
broader Chevron rule because it affects a smaller subset of agency decisions and 
considers one factor that is surely relevant to discovering actual intent. But by raising the 
procedural issue to a safe harbor, Mead sacrifices the objective of getting the delegation 
question right in favor of certainty and predictability—a goal that it then undermines by 
suggesting vaguely that other circumstances might also dictate substantial judicial 
deference.45 Supreme Court opinions since Mead can be read to suggest that the Court is 
                                                 
42 For an indictment of Mead’s hybrid approach, see Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, __ Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2003). 
43 Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 771, 792 (2002). 
44 David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 218-19. 
45 Some judicial deference may be appropriate even for interpretations by agencies that are not promulgated 
through formal procedures and that do not exhibit any other features that would allow courts to infer that 
Congress delegated the law-interpreting function to the agency. But in these cases, deference is due only 
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returning to a multifactor approach, assessing a variety of considerations relevant to 
either discovering an implicit congressional delegation or determining what a reasonable 
legislature would have done in a particular case.46 
 The challenges posed for courts of a multifactor standard are substantial because 
so many factors might be relevant. As Barron and Kagan observe: “Congress’s view on 
deference (were Congress to consider the matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-
specific and agency-specific variables, not readily susceptible to judicial understanding or 
analysis.”47 Various relevant factors can be discerned from the case law and other 
discussions of the formulation of regulatory policy. Any judicial attempt to discern 
congressional intent or to conclude what the legislature might intend if members thought 
about the issue could require consideration of at least four types of issues, some of which 
have not played a role in judicial deliberations in the past. First, the kind of question 
arguably delegated to the agency is relevant in the inquiry. Whether Congress has 
delegated broadly or narrowly, whether the issue lies in the particular expertise of the 
agency and of experts generally,48 whether it depends primarily on qualitative or 
quantitative assessments,49 and whether it relates to other areas in which the agency has 
broad authority would be appropriate considerations. Some of these factors are mentioned 
in Chevron as justification for finding delegation in ambiguity.50 
Second, as Mead indicates, the kind of procedure authorized by Congress and 
used by the agency seems pertinent, but more than just the formality of the process ought 
to be considered in the application of a multifactor standard. For example, the 
transparency of the process,51 the degree of participation by affected interests, and the 
legal effect of the action that will emerge from the process (i.e., whether the ruling is 
                                                                                                                                                 
because the agency interpretation is persuasive and reflects superior expertise, a less stringent level of 
deference provided in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
46 See William S. Jordan III, Updating Deference: The Court's 2001-2002 Term Sows More Confusion 
About Chevron, 32 ELR 11459, 11463-67 (2002) (discussing cases). 
47 David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 223. 
48 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, supra note 16, at 1255-56. 
49 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 
1708, 1731 (2002) (arguing for more deference to quantitative analysis by agencies, although one could 
make arguments for precisely the opposite conclusion if qualitative judgments depended more crucially on 
policy determinations). 
50 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-66. 
51 See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, After “Hiding the Ball” is Over: How the NLRB Must Change Its Approach 
to Decision-Making, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 523, 565 (2002) (discussing NLRB cases where courts have 
emphasized this factor). 
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broadly applicable and perhaps whether it is self-executing52) all seem relevant 
considerations. Third, Barron and Kagan have argued that deference ought to rest in some 
degree on who in the agency has made the actual interpretive decision, so that only 
decisions made by “the official Congress named in the relevant delegation” would qualify 
for Chevron deference.53 One might disagree with the emphasis that Barron and Kagan 
place on this factor,54 but it certainly is a candidate for consideration at least in some 
circumstances. 
Fourth, although seemingly overlooked in the case law, characteristics of the 
particular agency are no doubt relevant to Congress when it decides whether to delegate 
law-interpreting powers. Notwithstanding the importance of this factor, none of the 
judicial approaches, whether they are rule-like or standard-like, make distinctions on the 
basis of which agency is interpreting the statute. Instead, Chevron’s rule has been applied 
to any ambiguous statutory language, regardless of which agency was charged with 
administering the regulatory program. Similarly, Mead’s safe harbor of certain formal 
procedures is available for any agency that has been granted the power to use such 
formats for policymaking. The absence of agency-specific considerations in the analysis 
seems strange, at least to the extent that the tests purport to discern actual congressional 
intent. Congress’ decision to delegate authority to a particular agency is informed by both 
its view of agency capabilities generally and the reputation and qualifications of the 
particular agency. 
Notwithstanding their apparent relevance, agency-specific variables tend not to be 
considered explicitly by courts, even when they use multifactor standards rather than 
across-the-board rules. Of course, determinations of agency expertise, arguably relevant 
to Chevron deference, perhaps available under Mead, and certainly relevant to 
application of Skidmore deference, can sometimes involve varying degrees of agency-
specific evaluations.55 One suspects that courts also treat agencies differently on the basis 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 891 (discussing this factor in a 
different context). 
53 David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 235-36. 
54 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 578-79 n.620. 
55 See Jim Rossi, supra note 2, at 1135-36 (discussing in context of deference to rulings by the EEOC). 
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of their reputations, although this factor is not expressly identified as influential.56 For 
example, some have noted that the National Labor Relations Board seems to be given 
less deference, in part because of its preference to make policy through adjudication and 
not rulemaking57 but also because its reputation makes it suspect in some quarters.58 
Other agencies with problematic reputations, like the Federal Election Commission and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may also receive less deference in practice, 
although this reality is seldom explicitly stated in opinions.59 
If one wants to determine whether Congress really has delegated law-interpreting 
power to an agency, assessing the characteristics and general reputation of the agency is 
crucial. Relevant factors would include whether the agency is independent or under the 
direct control of the President, whether the agency is subject to capture by powerful 
interest groups and what sort of interest group activity typifies its regulatory 
environment, how politically salient the issues within the agency’s jurisdiction are for the 
general public, the political pressures brought to bear on the agency by Congress, its 
committees and the President, and indications that the President, the Office of 
Management and Budget or other executive branch officers do not trust the agency. How 
                                                 
56 See Michael Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 1739 (“Perhaps courts already consider agency reputation 
implicitly, seeking to curtail agencies with a reputation for stretching their authority or achieving 
ideological objectives.”). See also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, supra note 34, at 1021-22 (finding 
different “success” rates for different agencies, but suggesting that those differences could be a function of 
subject matter or procedural choice, rather than of agency reputation); Louis L. Jaffe, supra note 4, at 557 
(making general point well before Chevron); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, Issues in 
Leg. Scholarship, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (2002): Article 9 (generally observing that agencies 
have different reputations depending on their behavior). 
57 It appears that interpretations adopted in formal adjudications do receive Chevron deference, a 
conclusion buttressed by Mead. See Steven Croley, supra note 30, at 3 (describing application of Chevron 
to formal adjudications). However, scholars have argued whether such deference in the context of formal 
adjudications is appropriate, and the judicial treatment has not been consistent. See Michael J. Hayes, supra 
note 51, at 564-71 (discussing scholarly debate and judicial opinions, but concluding that deference to 
NLRB adjudications is appropriate under Chevron and Mead). 
58 Not only might judges, particularly conservative ones, view the NLRB with distrust, but the statutory 
framework in which the Board operates might suggest that Congress views the agency as less deserving of 
deference. See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at 832. Merrill and Hickman argue that less deference is 
appropriately paid to NLRB interpretations through adjudication because the Board’s orders are not self-
executing. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 892. But see David J. Barron & 
Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 219 (arguing that the fact courts must execute NLRB adjudicatory orders 
ought not to make a difference in the level of deference). 
59 The observation in the text is based in part on my experience as a clerk in the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals and on the views of other clerks, including the moderator of this panel. Of course, both agencies 
have received Chevron deference in the past. See William S. Jordan III, Judicial Review of Informal 
Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, not Christensen or Mead, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 
719, 731 (2002). 
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these factors play out in each case is not obvious. For example, does evidence that the 
President is not pleased with the agency’s regulatory decisions indicate that the agency 
relies on expertise, rather than politics, to set policy? And how should an agency weigh 
political considerations with other factors in interpreting its organic statute? 
This list of factors is by no means exhaustive, although its breadth and complexity 
provide a sense of the challenge to courts in applying multifactor standards. The 
complexity is increased because the mix of factors will change over time as Congress’ 
view of appropriate delegations changes, or as the relationship among the branches 
evolves. Moreover, the factors will sometimes point to different conclusions about the 
congressional delegation even within the same statute, adding to the complications.60 In 
short, both types of judicial approaches—the across-the-board presumption which 
provides certainty (at least in theory) at the price of errors in determining congressional 
intent and the more nuanced standard which imposes decision costs on the judiciary with 
uncertain improvements in the error rate—have limitations. The fact that both types of 
judicial review are not entirely satisfactory may explain why courts have been unable to 
settle on one or the other and, for the time being, are inconsistently applying an uneasy 
combination of the two. 
Although both Marbury and modern administrative law precedents indicate that 
Congress decides whether agencies or courts will be the primary interpreters of 
regulatory statutes, and that courts merely ascertain congressional intent as they 
determine “what the law is,” the reality is that the judiciary, not Congress, is in the 
driver’s seat. Express congressional directives are virtually nonexistent, and courts are 
unable to accurately find an implicit delegation or guess what the legislature might have 
done had it thought about the matter. Thus, the first institutional choice decision—which 
institution decides who will be the primary interpreter of unclear statutes—has been 
effectively resolved in favor of courts. One suspects that, among other considerations, the 
judges’ views of the wisdom of the agency’s interpretation affect the strength of the 
deference.61 It is not therefore surprising that courts often determine that deference is 
                                                 
60 See Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 472 (discussing Breyer’s approach). 
61 See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, supra note 34, at 108-09 (correctly predicting that the 
relatively politically conservative Supreme Court justices would adopt doctrines requiring less deference to 
agency interpretations as the Democrats had more influence on agency outcomes); Linda R. Cohen & 
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unwarranted; then judges do not face the unattractive prospect of upholding agency 
interpretations with which they do not agree. In other words, courts are interested parties 
with respect to the second institutional choice determination, and not surprisingly, they 
make the choice in favor of judicial primacy in many cases. But because they understand 
that the doctrine demands they obey any congressional instruction, the jurisprudence has 
been unstable as courts vacillate among various unsatisfactory methods purporting to 
enable them to find congressional intent. Courts seem unwilling to eschew the inquiry 
into intent altogether and explicitly embark on the formulation of a judicial doctrine, 
perhaps based solely on institutional considerations, that could provide more certainty for 
regulated parties, agencies, and Congress. 
But is this the only possible state of affairs? How would the second institutional-
choice decision—whether agencies or courts have the primary responsibility to interpret 
statutes—be resolved if Congress more frequently provided clear instructions? Whether 
such explicit congressional directives are likely or even possible is the question I turn to 
next. 
 
II. Providing Congress the Opportunity to Legislate Chevron 
 
The decision to delegate law-interpreting authority to an agency or a court is different 
from the sort of delegation decision Congress usually makes in the regulatory context. 
Typically, Congress is determining substantive policy, and the extent of detail it provides 
in the delegation will determine how much discretion the subsequent policymaker has as 
it pursues regulatory objectives. Here, however, the delegation concerns which institution 
is given the discretion to set policy—courts or agencies. Congress can provide more or 
less detail to constrain the discretion, and that decision may be affected by the 
congressional view of the institution that will exercise the discretion. Nonetheless, it may 
be helpful to differentiate this delegation decision—which institution makes policy 
through statutory interpretation—from the decision of how to delegate and with what 
                                                                                                                                                 
Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical 
Test, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 431, 474-75 (1996) (finding that “the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial 
deference, but rather does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy outcomes more to 
the Court’s liking.”). 
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amount of specificity, the decision that the delegation scholarship typically focuses on.62 
As I discussed above in the context of describing how courts might assess that choice 
between institutions, a variety of factors are relevant to determine institutional 
competence to make policy within the authority delegated through vague, ambiguous, or 
incomplete language. These factors relate to the nature of the issue, the procedures 
through which agency interpretations will be reached, the position of the agency official 
likely to adopt the interpretation, the reputation and expertise of the agency itself, the 
need for a relatively independent determination rather than a decision infused with 
politics and specific regulatory missions, and the need to integrate an interpretive 
decision into a complex regulatory framework. Congress is better suited than the courts to 
weighing these factors in the larger context of designing the regulatory state and those 
entities that will administer it. 
 
A. Congress and Opt-Out Provisions of Default Rules of Judicial Review 
of Regulatory Statutes 
  
Congress, because of its frequent interactions with agency personnel, has a better 
sense than the judicial branch of the expertise that can be brought to bear by a particular 
agency on a question of statutory interpretation. Lawmakers either already know or can 
easily gather information using committees, staff and witnesses about the larger statutory 
framework in which an agency works, the general level of discretion accorded to the 
agency, and the reputation that the agency has developed over time and enjoys currently. 
Little of that information will be available to a court trying to determine, within the 
confines of a particular case dealing with specific facts and parties, whether it should 
defer to an agency interpretation of a few words of statutory text. In addition, Congress 
can revise its decision to delegate authority to an agency or the judiciary to account for 
changes in the regulatory environment, changes that are often related to expertise but 
might also turn on changes in the political environment. A court finds revision more 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through 
Delegation (1993). To the extent the scholarship focuses on institutional choice questions, it is usually 
concerned with the choice among agencies, taking account of their different characteristics. See, e.g., David 
Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Approach to Policy Making Under 
Separate Powers 151-54 (1999). 
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difficult, both because it must wait for an appropriate case and because it often lacks the 
information necessary to justify changing course. Thus, Congress has technocratic 
advantages over courts for a variety of reasons: its institutional design, access to experts, 
repeat interactions with the agency, and a more comprehensive perspective. 
Political considerations also play a vital role in any decision to allocate law-
interpreting authority to an agency or to the courts because interpretation in these 
contexts is an aspect of regulatory policymaking. Determining the appropriate regulatory 
program, including identifying regulatory objectives, prioritizing among various 
objectives in a world of limited resources, and choosing the means to reach the objectives 
considered most worthy of attention, is a process that necessarily and appropriately 
involves both expertise and politics. Agencies are sensitive to the demands of two 
political principals that they serve—the President and Congress—and constantly balance 
those demands within the structure of the regulatory framework put into place by an 
earlier group of lawmakers and shaped by the history of the actions of other Presidents 
and executive branch officers.63 Chevron’s preference that agencies interpret ambiguous 
statutory language or fill in statutory lacunae was based in part on the Court’s 
understanding of the relevance of policy and politics to such determinations and its own 
institutional limitations in this respect.64 However, it might be the case that, in some 
circumstances, the enacting Congress will prefer that policymaking through interpretation 
be more insulated from current political pressures than is possible in the agency 
environment, even in an independent agency that is somewhat separate from the 
President. Whatever the allocative choice, it is based in part on political considerations—
that is, deciding how extensive a continuing role politics should play in regulatory 
policymaking is itself a political decision, taking account of the need to consider current 
political realities during implementation of a regulatory structure devised in the past. 
Once it is acknowledged that political considerations are legitimate, along with 
expertise-related considerations, in the interpretation of regulatory statutes, the 
desirability of Congress’ playing a more active role in allocating law-interpreting 
authority either to agencies or courts becomes apparent. Congress has the comparative 
                                                 
63 See Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 56, at 14 (discussing various political influences at work to shape 
agency policymaking). 
64 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
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advantage over the judiciary in making the determination concerning the appropriate role 
of politics and making it publicly. Courts are loathe to discuss political factors 
transparently in their opinions. In a related context of judicial review of the 
reasonableness of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s decision 
under President Reagan to rescind certain passive restraint regulations, only Justice 
Rehnquist explicitly addressed the clear political overtones of the agency’s decisions: 
The agency’s changed view of the [passive restraint] standard seems to be related to 
the election of a new President of a different political party. … A change in 
administration brought about by people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable 
basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs 
and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by 
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light 
of the philosophy of the administration.65 
 
The unwillingness of the State Farm majority to assess the presence and importance of 
political considerations reflects a general judicial distaste for such analysis. Generally, 
then, courts either try to avoid the political analysis—which denies them access to an 
important consideration in the decision whether the allocate law-interpreting authority to 
agencies or retain it themselves—or they do not reveal the role that such an analysis plays 
in their decision, thereby undermining the ability of the public to understand and evaluate 
regulatory policy. The first strategy leads to incomplete decisionmaking, and the second 
is incompatible with norms of democratic accountability. Thus, Congress’ comparative 
advantage is not merely technocratic, it is essentially an advantage held by the more 
democratic institution in the context of political decisions that should reflect policy 
judgments of representatives who must answer to the people. 
If Congress has a greater capacity to compare the judicial and executive branches and 
determine which should be given law-interpreting power in the context of the larger 
regulatory scheme, why not require better evidence that Congress has actually made the 
delegation decision? One answer is no better evidence is required. Congress would 
generally want courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory text, so a 
default rule allocating the power to agencies captures what is usually the right answer. If 
                                                 
65 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The regulatory decision at issue in 
Chevron was also the result, in significant part, of a change in presidential administration and political 
mood. 
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Congress has not acted in the face of judicial application of an across-the-board 
presumption, then it must have approved of the effect of the default rule. To put it another 
way, a default rule could be intent-mimicking in the way that some contract default rules 
work to decrease transaction costs by specifying what parties would typically want.66 If 
such a default rule operated successfully, Congress would have to enact express 
directives only in the small number of cases where it prefers that courts serve as the 
primary interpreters of vague and ambiguous language. The default rule would thus 
reduce transactions costs for Congress and allow it to deploy its limited resources more 
effectively. 
One problem with this answer is that it is not clear that an intent-mimicking default 
rule is appropriate here. When important constitutional values are at stake, as Marbury 
suggests they are in this context, the default can be set so that it protects those values and 
requires Congress to state explicitly that it wishes to adopt a policy close to the 
constitutional gray area.67 However, if the realities of the legislative process make it 
unlikely that Congress actually can enact express directives, a Marbury-inspired default 
rule means that courts will defer to agencies in only a handful of cases. In that case, a 
compelling normative argument can be mounted for the opposite approach: an across-the-
board presumption of deference to agencies. In the face of persistent congressional 
silence, courts should choose a rule that allocates lawmaking authority to the 
democratically accountable and more expert agencies, rather than to the judiciary. 
Perhaps that allocation comports with congressional intent, but that is not seen as the 
primary justification for the rule, which is a pragmatic approach to deal with the reality of 
congressional inaction. Congress, rather than courts, may have the better technocratic and 
democratic credentials when it comes to allocating the power to interpret laws, but 
Congress does not discharge this responsibility. It is thus better to adopt a rule that places 
primary interpretive authority with the agencies, rather than the courts, because of the 
former’s superior technocratic and democratic credentials.68 As this disagreement 
demonstrates, the default rule of judicial review for regulatory statutes can be chosen 
                                                 
66 See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 Tulsa L.J. 679, 681-82 (1999). 
67 See id. at 685-86. 
68 See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 Duke 
L.J. 1013, 1056-57 (1998). 
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without paying much attention to what Congress intended or might have intended. 
Instead, it can be set according to one’s vision of the appropriate role of agencies and 
courts in policymaking through statutory interpretation, but with an opt-out provision that 
allows congressional variance. 
Some current scholarship revolves around this disagreement over the right 
background rule for courts to adopt. These scholars sometimes treat congressional intent 
as a relevant but not paramount concern, but more importantly they appear to have given 
up on the notion that Congress might decide how to allocate law-interpreting authority in 
any but the rarest of cases. To put it another way, these scholars accept that the first 
institutional choice decision I have identified—whether Congress or the courts will 
decide which institution has the power to interpret regulatory statutes—has been 
essentially made in favor of courts. Thus, they seek to focus our attention on ways to 
improve the judicial decision about whether or not to defer to agencies. For example, 
Cass Sunstein argues that such a judgment should based on institutional attributes, and he 
favors locating law-interpreting authority in the agencies because their “democratic 
pedigree” is clearly more impressive than the courts.69 In addition, interpretation of 
ambiguous terms in regulatory statutes is closely related to “an understanding of 
underlying facts,” and agencies have the better technocratic credentials to make these 
judgment calls.70 
Merrill and Watt also favor judicial adoption of a bright-line rule, although they link 
their proposal more closely to ascertaining actual congressional intent. Their historical 
analysis of judicial review of regulatory statutes concludes with a discussion of various 
possible default rules, or canons, that courts could apply in a rule-like fashion. They favor 
a particular approach based on their understanding of the drafting convention used by 
Congress in the first half of the last century, but their primary conclusion is that the 
judiciary should adopt some sort of general rule, rather than an ad hoc application of a 
standard, because “then Congress will generally know what to say in a statute to 
                                                 
69 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1056. 
70 Id. at 1057. See also Adrian Vermeule, supra note 42, at [12-13] (giving serious consideration to 
adopting the Mead procedural safe harbor as a rule of judicial review and adopting an institutional 
approach throughout his analysis); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, supra note 9 (arguing in favor of 
institutional approach in variety of contexts including interpretation of regulatory statutes). 
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delegate” to an agency the power to act with force of law.”71 They envision a dialogue 
between Congress and the courts in which the legislature communicates relatively clearly 
with judges through statutory language. If that institutional discussion takes place, courts 
can more legitimately reach conclusions about congressional intent to delegate. 
Thus, all the approaches to the question of judicial review include some role for 
Congress to play, and in some cases that role is envisioned as relatively active. If the 
judicial approach is conceived as intent-mimicking, then it must be grounded by some 
theory about congressional intent and the ability of Congress to vary the rule when its 
intent is different. If the rule is set for some other reason, either to empower the judiciary 
to interpret the law in the context of regulatory statutes as it does with respect to other 
statutes or to empower agencies to use statutory interpretation as a policymaking tool, 
room is left for Congress to strike the balance differently in a particular case. Presumably, 
the congressional opt-out feature of the default rule proposals is designed to be real and 
not illusory, although few commentators hold out much hope that Congress will respond 
frequently, if at all. Such pessimism has an empirical basis. Despite the invitation to 
Congress to interact with the courts in setting the appropriate level of judicial review, 
Congress generally remains silent. That silence is mystifying no matter what general 
approach to judicial review one favors because it seems unlikely that Congress would 
never—or almost never—want to vary the background interpretive regime. 
Perhaps Congress’ silence reflects its confusion about the default rule. Scholarly 
proposals, like those discussed above, favor consistent application of a bright-line rule 
that would provide Congress with a clear interpretive background. This vision of the 
optimal judicial review diverges substantially from the reality of the judiciary’s 
zigzagging course through a variety of approaches, each of which is applied 
inconsistently. Even after the Chevron decision, its scope remained unclear, and judges 
increasingly found deference unnecessary as they aggressively used interpretive 
techniques at Step One. The application of the recently-adopted Mead approach has so far 
been similarly inconsistent.72 Without a certain interpretive background, Congress does 
not know where to focus its attention. It is certainly unrealistic to think that it will 
                                                 
71 Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 579. 
72 See id. at 576 n.615 (discussing subsequent Supreme Court cases); Adrian Vermeule, supra note 42 
(discussing application in the D.C. Circuit). 
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delegate clearly in every statute, so the inability to target intelligently may reduce the 
chance that it targets at all. Even in the unlikely event that courts choose a presumption 
and stick with it, it is not clear that any judicial canon can be frequently salient to 
lawmakers during the legislative process. Staff members and experts in the body may 
think about judicial doctrines when crafting bills, but these considerations may fade in the 
press of legislative business. 
A legislative rule backed up with enforcement procedures can be more broadly and 
frequently salient to lawmakers, particularly if the internal rules are triggered when 
legislation relevant to the agency’s authority is being considered. In other words, 
Congress may not have entered into this dialogue with the courts either because it has no 
clear idea of what it is responding to, or because it forgets that an invitation to 
communicate has been offered. Of course, Congress often finds it difficult to muster 
majority support for clear statutory text, so vagueness and ambiguity in this realm may 
simply be another example of the congressional penchant for open-textured language as a 
way to avoid opposition and surmount the procedural obstacles to enactment. No 
procedure can eliminate lawmakers’ desire to sometimes avoid making difficult political 
decisions, although rules can empower a few members who seek clear resolution of such 
issues to force a vote of the body on the matter. 
 
B. Devising an Action-Prompting Mechanism to Structure Congressional 
Decisionmaking 
 
Congressional silence may be primarily the product of congressional unwillingness to 
address the issue. Rather than taking responsibility for choosing the law-interpreting 
institution with respect to regulatory statutes, lawmakers may often seek to avoid the 
decision by punting it to the judiciary. But it seems unlikely that Congress would avoid 
making the institutional choice decision in virtually every case. Surely, there are some 
instances where enough lawmakers, either because of constituent pressures, ideology, or 
party pressure, would be willing to provide clear instructions if they had the power under 
congressional procedures to bring the matter to the attention of the full body. The 
widespread acceptance of the conclusion that Congress is very unlikely to provide clearer 
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directives allocating law-interpreting authority to agencies or courts is supported by an 
unduly cramped view of the legislative vehicles available for Congress to use as a means 
of communication, and a general ignorance in legal scholarship of various internal 
enforcement mechanisms that can increase the chance of congressional consideration of 
particular issues. Only two kinds of legislative vehicles have been discussed in the 
literature as mechanisms for Congress to use to opt out of a default rule of judicial 
review; both have limitations. 
First, Congress could pass a broad statute allocating the law-interpreting power to 
either agencies or courts with respect to all questions of ambiguous language, or perhaps 
assigning the power to agencies in certain defined circumstances (such as when they use 
particular procedures) and to courts in all other instances. Section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act appears to be such a general articulation of institutional 
choice, requiring the “reviewing court to decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional or statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action.” The Bumpers amendment, considered by Congress in the 
1970s and early 1980s, was this sort of statute designed to underscore that the judiciary 
should determine the meaning of statutory terms in regulatory statutes in the same way 
that they interpret text in other statutes.73 Had the Bumpers amendment passed, courts 
arguably would not have been justified in according substantial deference to agency 
interpretations, but could have considered them only as extrinsic evidence from an expert 
source. 
This legislative approach has certain advantages. It applies the congressional rule to 
all statutes, even those enacted in the past. It can exempt certain statutes from the blanket 
rule in a savings provision, just as it can vary the rule in subsequent enactments through 
express provisions. Such a congressional enactment might also be more salient to 
Congress than a judicially-adopted across-the-board presumption, and thus spark more 
consideration of the delegation issue when Congress enacts new regulatory statutes. In 
addition, interest groups may be less influential with respect to a general provision than 
                                                 
73 Under Senator Bumpers’ legislation, courts would have been required to “independently” decide all 
questions of law, including statutory interpretation questions. See Statement of Senator Bumpers on S. 
2408, 121 Cong. Rec. 29956-58 (Sept. 27, 1975); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Regulatory 
Procedures Act of 1981, H.R. 746, Serial No. 27 (1981). 
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they would be in the context of statute-specific provisions.74 Such a broad statute forces 
interest groups to operate behind a somewhat opaque veil of ignorance because they 
cannot be sure of their positions on all affected statutes, or they may be in different 
positions depending on the program and agency.75 
Nonetheless, such “superstatutes” in the regulatory arena have been problematic for 
many in Congress who believe that a one-size-fits-all or one-size-fits-mostly-all approach 
is heavy-handed. Others may be worried that applying such a general rule to all 
previously-enacted statutes would be unwise and lead to unanticipated consequences. 
Because Congress cannot possibly predict all the possible applications of the general rule, 
it may be better to resolve the delegation issue in a more targeted way, or to leave the 
decision to the judiciary that proceeds in a case-by-case way.76 Nonetheless, there has 
been some support for the approach in the past; the Bumper amendment was nearly 
enacted, passing the Senate unanimously, only a few years before the Court decided 
Chevron.77 
Alternatively, Congress could make the delegation decision with respect to each 
regulatory statute. Not only does this seem unlikely, given past behavior and institutional 
limitations, the approach affects only statutes enacted in the future. For a more 
comprehensive solution, Congress would be required to embark on a parallel effort to 
assess past statutes and decide what guidance is appropriate. Congress does not typically 
undertake retrospective analysis of past regulatory statutes, even when it adopts new 
procedural approaches that will apply broadly to future laws.78 Even if Congress was 
                                                 
74 See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 
247, 274-75 (1996) (making this point in the context of different “supermandate” proposals in the 
regulatory arena). 
75 See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J. 399 (2001) (making 
point generally); Elizabeth Garrett, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Future Democratic Politics, in The 
Future of Democratic Politics: Principles and Practices __, __ (G. Pomper & M.D. Weiner eds. 2003) 
(forthcoming) (discussing this type of interest group behavior in a different congressional context). 
76 See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 34, at 1031 (arguing that a Bumpers amendment approach would be 
an “overreaction”). 
77 See Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 474-75. See also James T. O’Reilly, Deference Makes a 
Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 739 (1980). 
But see Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 74, at 251-53 (observing that such far-reaching statutes are difficult to 
pass in the regulatory context). 
78 See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which applied only to new mandates. Although Title 
III required the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to review unfunded mandate 
generally, there were no enforcement provisions in this title, unlike the provisions affecting new mandates. 
See also Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at 824 (“Congress does not have the time or institutional 
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disposed to review old statutes and amend them to include instructions about law-
interpreting authority, the sheer number of regulatory statutes renders the task a 
formidable one. Given limited time and energy, lawmakers would review only a few 
enactments, leaving the rule with regard to the others to courts to determine. 
Although pessimistic conclusions about Congress’ ability to respond to a general rule 
of judicial review and delegate clearly are understandable, we can expect more from 
Congress, particularly if its attention is brought to a realistic mechanism through which to 
communicate. Such a mechanism could be action-forcing, or more likely it would be 
action-prompting in that Congress could still avoid making an explicit decision, 
notwithstanding the procedural reform. There are promising legislative mechanisms that 
could be slightly reconfigured to make it more likely that Congress was aware of its 
power to vary the rule of judicial review and to empower groups of lawmakers who 
wished to prompt consideration and passage of express direction. These legislative 
vehicles represent a middle-ground approach between a broad statute along the lines of 
the Bumpers Amendment and a time-consuming statute-by-statute assessment. Congress 
currently reviews agencies periodically, every few years when it re-authorizes agencies or 
large programs administered by agencies, and annually when it appropriates money to 
keep the government operating.79 Congress could use these periodically-considered 
legislative vehicles to instruct courts and agencies about its decision with regard to law-
interpreting authority. Provisions in these bills could instruct that law-interpreting 
authority was delegated generally to a particular agency, that it was delegated to an 
agency in all cases where particular procedures were used, that it was delegated only with 
respect to certain statutes, or that it was not delegated to the agency at all. These bills 
                                                                                                                                                 
capacity to review and amend all existing delegations to agencies to add the appropriate tag line to assure 
the desired allocation of interpretational authority is reached.”). 
79 Executive branch departments and agencies are funded through discretionary spending, which means that 
Congress evaluates the agencies and their funding needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See 
Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 Harv. J. 
Legis. 387, 398-400 (1998) (describing discretionary spending and budget process generally). Some 
programs administered by agencies are not funded through discretionary appropriations but instead receive 
funding through direct spending, which means their funding occurs automatically until Congress amends or 
repeals the underlying statute. Social Security, Medicare, and some transportation and agriculture programs 
are examples of this sort of direct or mandatory spending. Although these programs are not reviewed 
through the annual appropriations process and may not be reviewed periodically through the re-
authorization process, they are administered by agencies that rely on discretionary funds, so the decisions 
about law-interpreting authority relating to these direct spending programs could be made when agency 
funding is before Congress. 
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would allow Congress to resolve the issue in a more targeted way than a superstatute 
would, but it would similarly provide a format where the delegation would apply to 
previously-enacted statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction and to subsequent statutes. 
Three different kinds of legislative vehicles—authorization laws, appropriations bills, 
and omnibus appropriations legislation—could be used by Congress; however, the 
formats are not equally well-suited to provide an appropriate context for congressional 
deliberation and decisionmaking. First, authorizing legislation is the optimal vehicle for 
such provisions. As Allen Schick explains: 
Authorizations represent the exercise of the legislative power accorded to 
Congress by the Constitution. … In exercising its legislative power, Congress can 
place just about any kind of provision in an authorization. It can prescribe what an 
agency must or may not do in carrying out assigned responsibilities. It can spell out 
the agency’s organizational structure and its operating procedures. It can grant an 
agency broad authority or restrict its operating freedom by legislating in great detail.80 
 
Authorization bills design agencies, and a crucial part of agency design is what kind of 
lawmaking authority, including the power to interpret ambiguous language, the agency 
should receive and how it should deploy that power. Again, this type of delegation 
decision is different from the typical one in a regulatory statute: here, Congress is 
determining the design of regulatory institutions, not the detail of its substantive policy 
instructions. Thus, the decision seems particularly well-suited to the environment of 
authorizing bills; the deliberative process on the Chevron issue would be enhanced if it 
occurred during a comprehensive evaluation of the agency. 
There are two kinds of authorizing legislation. An organic or enabling statute sets 
up the agency or program, containing broad grants of authority, establishing jobs and 
duties, and spelling out policy details. Related legislation authorizes the appropriation of 
funds for particular responsibilities or programs; these laws provide the basis for 
subsequent and separate appropriations bills that actually provide funding.81 Since the 
1960s, Congress has increasingly used temporary authorizations of the second type so 
that it will have opportunities to oversee, reconsider and change programs on the basis of 
                                                 
80 Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 164 (rev. ed. 2000). 
81 Congressional Budget Office, Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations 2 (Jan. 15, 
2003). 
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experience and the implementing agency’s performance.82 In some cases, events have 
caused Congress to change programs and agencies from permanent authorizations to 
temporary ones in order to increase oversight. Thus, programs like the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, the Superfund, recent reform of federal welfare laws, and the Rural 
Electrification Loan Restructuring program, and agencies like the Department of Justice, 
NASA, and the Securities and Exchange Commission must be reauthorized periodically. 
One advantage of using the authorization process to consider which institution 
should have primary responsibility to interpret regulatory statutes is that it may structure 
interest group activity in a relatively productive way. In many cases, the key to 
harnessing interest groups is to construct an environment in which they can bring forth 
information that will help lawmakers decide on their course of action83 but that also has 
enough uncertainty in it that groups are not entirely sure how any particular decision will 
advance their interests. The latter feature restrains the ability of groups to pursue their 
narrow self-interest, although there must be enough information about the future so that 
policymakers can legislate with sufficient detail.84 A moderate amount of uncertainty for 
affected parties is present during the authorization process, which typically runs on a 
three-, five-, or even ten-year cycle. When agencies and large programs are being 
designed, or when they are being redesigned in the re-authorization process, interest 
groups have some experience with the agencies and can anticipate the areas of regulatory 
emphasis, so they will work to influence lawmakers and to provide them with relevant 
information about the agency’s performance. However, at the same time, interest groups 
may not be entirely certain of which particular issues the agency will place on the top of 
the regulatory agenda in the next few years. Thus, they may not be sure whether they will 
prefer courts or agencies to have the primary responsibility for statutory interpretation, a 
situation that can restrain self-interested behavior to some extent. 
 To ensure that Congress actually considered the delegation issue and reached 
some decision that was clearly expressed in the legislation, the legislature could adopt 
internal rules mandating that these provisions be included in any authorization bill 
                                                 
82 Allen Schick, supra note 80, at 168-70. 
83 For a discussion of the role of interest groups in providing information to policymakers, see Elizabeth 
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 501, 556-61 (1998). 
84 See Adrian Vermeule, supra note 75, at 428 (discussing information-neutrality tradeoff). 
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reported out of committee. A modern committee report contains a great deal of 
mandatory information, some required by budget rules, some by other congressional 
rules. In the House, for example, each committee report contains relevant oversight 
findings and recommendations, cost estimates, a statement of the constitutional authority 
supporting enactment of the bill, an estimate of the costs of any federal mandate on state 
and local governments, and a preemption statement.85 Although many rules deal with the 
content of committee reports, congressional rules could encourage lawmakers to place 
any delegation of law-interpreting authority in the legislation itself to ensure that courts 
and agencies understood that the instruction has the force of law. 
Internal rules governing the content of legislation and committee reports could be 
enforced in both houses through a point of order process. Points of order allow members 
of Congress to object to the consideration of laws that violate congressional rules and to 
force a vote of the body before deliberation can proceed. In the Senate, some budget 
points of order are enforced through supermajority voting requirements so that a three-
fifths vote is mandated to waive the objection. In the House, the point-of-order process 
can be made more effective by prohibiting waiver of any such objections in the special 
rule promulgated by the Rules Committee that structures floor deliberation.86 The 
enforcement provisions should be calibrated to ensure that Congress would have an 
opportunity to consider the issue of delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies 
while not providing those who want to obstruct passage of the underlying bills too great a 
strategic advantage. In this context, a relatively low level of enforcement is required, 
because the Chevron issue is not especially different from other delegation issues that do 
not receive enhanced protection. Thus, the procedure should rely on simple majority 
votes to waive the points of order and require that a group of lawmakers agree to raise the 
objection rather than allowing only one member to stall any bill on this ground. If this 
mechanism is envisioned as a procedure that will be used only infrequently to vary the 
application of a consistently applied judicial default rule, then the enforcement 
                                                 
85 House Committee on Rules, A Primer on Committee Reports, available at 
http://www.house.gov/rules/comm._rep_primer.htm (visited on Jan. 20, 2003). 
86 See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L.J. 
1277, 1326-30 (2001) (discussing such an enforcement mechanism in the context of a proposal for a 
congressional framework to improve constitutional decisionmaking). 
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mechanisms should be even less stringent, requiring a relatively large group of 
lawmakers to trigger it and perhaps allowing waiver in the House by a special rule. 
Enforcement would be easier here because interest groups affected by regulation 
would have an incentive to lobby Congress either to withhold the authority from agencies 
or to transfer traditional law-interpreting power to them from the courts, depending on 
how they expected to fare in a particular forum. Various interest groups would be 
affected differently by the decision, so there would likely be groups on both sides of the 
issue. Scholars who have brought theoretical frameworks to bear on the question of 
whether regulated groups generally prefer court interpretation to agency interpretation 
have reached differing conclusions.87 It seems safe to say that interests have various 
objectives, and that their views on the institutional choice question will change over time. 
In addition, study of the process of interpretation used by courts and agencies suggests 
that the two different institutions use different methods and assess information like 
legislative history and canons of construction differently.88 Agencies may often reach 
different conclusions than courts about the meaning of contested statutory language 
because their interpretation is necessarily infused with their views of their larger 
regulatory missions. Indeed, different agencies may approach interpretation differently.89 
These differences in interpretive approach would be relevant to interest groups and 
lawmakers. Such differences could lead interest groups to favor one interpreter or the 
other in particular circumstances, depending on how they expected the different 
approaches to influence the substantive outcomes. 
                                                 
87 Compare Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial 
Review, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 296 (1993) (concluding, after empirical analysis, that regulated interests will 
prefer courts to interpret ambiguous statutory language) with Frank H. Easterbrook, The Demand for 
Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372 (1993) (reaching opposite conclusion, based on economic theory 
and revealed preferences), and William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 382 
(1993) (same, using positive political theory). 
88 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 56 (discussing institutional differences and recommending 
different approaches); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to 
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321 (1990) 
(discussing different institutional capacities and incentives with respect to the use of legislative history). 
89 See Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 56, at 23 (discussing differences between Environmental Protection 
Agency and Department of Health and Human Resources). 
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Although sometimes the existence of contending interest groups encourages 
Congress to avoid deciding a matter, leaving it to be resolved by courts or agencies,90 a 
procedural framework can make abdication more difficult or can change the message of 
congressional silence. For example, once an internal rule required Congress to delegate 
law-interpreting authority to agencies in particular legislative vehicles, failure to make 
such a delegation might be read by courts as a signal for judges to act as primary 
interpreters of regulatory statutes. Groups that prefer agency interpretation would know 
that they would be less likely to convince a court to defer and thus have a greater 
incentive than they do today to convince Congress to delegate explicitly. Alternatively, if 
the courts adopted one of the approaches urged on them by some scholars and decided to 
apply a canon consistently that requires deference to agencies either whenever statutory 
text is ambiguous or a particular decisionmaking procedure is used, then congressional 
silence would empower agencies. No matter what the default rule applied by courts to 
determine the effect of congressional silence, once it is clearly established, interest 
groups would respond accordingly, focusing their efforts on taking advantage of the 
action-prompting mechanism put in place by the internal congressional rule. 
 Although authorizing legislation is the best vehicle for directives about law-
interpreting authority, it would not solve the problem for all statutes and all agencies. 
First, some agencies and programs have permanent authorizations so periodic assessment 
is not institutionalized. Nevertheless, Congress could revisit programs and agencies with 
permanent authorizations and amend the statutes, and it might be somewhat more likely 
to do so when the delegation issue was made salient by a new congressional process 
affecting reauthorizations and new authorizing legislation. Second, Congress occasionally 
fails to authorize programs to which it nonetheless appropriates money. Although internal 
rules require that programs have current authorizations before appropriations are in order, 
Congress can waive these rules expressly or implicitly by passing an appropriations law 
that establishes or continues funding for the program or agency. Congressional rules 
                                                 
90 See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 
Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982) (discussing this congressional strategy); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. 
Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 
59 (3d ed. 2001) (relying on work by economists and political scientists to present a transactional theory of 
legislative process that includes this prediction). 
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discourage substantive legislation on appropriations bills, but such riders are 
commonplace and have the force of law once enacted. 
 Accordingly, a second legislative vehicle—appropriations bills—could be used in 
some instances where the authorization process was unavailable. Any new procedure 
requiring Congress to delegate law-interpreting authority expressly should also apply to 
appropriations bills, encouraging explicit statements of delegations for programs that are 
either permanently authorized or not currently authorized. The Congressional Budget 
Office maintains lists of such programs91 so it is not difficult to discover when a 
delegation should occur in an appropriations bill. A point of order process could be used 
to enforce the rule. 
Using the appropriations process is not the best way to make the decision. One of 
the reasons that legislative riders on appropriations bills are discouraged by congressional 
rule and judicial decision is that the deliberation surrounding such bills focuses less on 
program design and more on funding level. In the frenzy that can accompany spending 
decisions, lawmakers may be less attentive to details of program and agency design. The 
system of dividing authorization bills from appropriations measures is supposed to ensure 
a dual level of oversight with the substantive committees shouldering the primary 
responsibility for institutional design. The delegation of law-interpreting authority is 
more clearly in the competence of the authorizing committees than in that of the 
appropriations subcommittees. Furthermore, appropriations bills are considered and 
passed annually, rather than every few years, and this frequency is not optimal for 
decisions about law-interpreting authority or other fundamental aspects of regulatory 
design. 
Nonetheless, in the real world of the legislative process, the appropriations 
subcommittees have a great deal of responsibility over substantive details of programs 
and exercise some amount of oversight. Thus, they have the expertise to make this 
decision, at least when compared to courts. Moreover, if the substantive committees 
understand that they would cede their power to allocate law-interpreting power to other 
lawmakers should they fail to live up their responsibility, they would have an incentive to 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, supra note 81 (required by section 202(e)(3) of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act). 
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provide directives to courts and agencies. If Congress provided its directions about law 
interpretation in an appropriations bills through the mechanism proposed here, courts 
would not be justified in applying the traditional canon construing riders to 
appropriations bills narrowly.92 The procedural mechanism and increased scrutiny would 
ameliorate the concerns about deliberative pathologies that undergird the use of the canon 
in other contexts. 
Of course, just as substantive committees sometimes fail to pass authorizing 
legislation, in some years Congress fails to pass all the appropriations bills. In such years, 
the government is funded either through continuing resolutions or, once an overall 
agreement on funding has been reached, through an omnibus appropriations bill.93 These 
legislative vehicles are not especially conducive to substantive provisions like those 
delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies, although they can contain substantive 
provisions and riders. They provide the least desirable context for Congress to legislate 
Chevron issues because the environment in which they are considered and passed makes 
it very likely that Congress would ignore any action-prompting mechanism and override 
any enforcement procedures. Thus, I do not recommend extending the procedure to 
include these bills when the other two legislative formats have not produced a clear 
legislative instruction. In years where the appropriations process breaks down (which 
tends to affect only some agencies and programs because usually a few of the thirteen 
appropriations bills are passed) and the authorization process is unavailable, previously 
enacted provisions allocating the authority would remain in effect. If no such provisions 
had been passed or had expired, the courts could proceed in the absence of a 
congressional delegation, interpreting the regulatory statute as they interpret other laws 
and considering agency views as persuasive but not controlling. Alternatively, if the 
judiciary was convinced that a background default rule of deference to the agency was 
                                                 
92 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory 
Interpretation 172 (200) (discussing the canon). 
93 Fiscal year 2003 was such a year; Congress did not complete work on eleven of the thirteen 
appropriations bills until February, over four months late. It finally enacted them in one large omnibus act. 
See Carl Huse, Spending Bill Is Scorned But Is a Sure Vote-Getter, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2003, at A22 
(criticizing both the process and the substance of the omnibus appropriations bill). Between the end of 
fiscal year 2002 and passage of the omnibus act, the government was funded through a series of continuing 
resolutions. 
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justified on normative grounds, then courts would understand silence to signal 
congressional acceptance of deference in this instance. 
 A procedural framework would make this issue of delegation more salient to 
lawmakers, and it would encourage the use of legislative vehicles that are regularly and 
frequently considered. The structure of these laws would enable Congress to make the 
proper trade-offs, thinking globally about agencies’ institutional competence, more 
specifically about a particular agency’s abilities, and finally about particular statutes and 
programs within the agency’s jurisdiction. Although it seems likely that Congress would 
often prefer to delegate this aspect of policymaking power to agencies, over which it has 
more influence than it does over the independent judiciary, the legislature would likely 
reach the opposite conclusion at least some of the time. Not only would some interest 
groups work to influence the legislature to favor the courts in some instances, but in the 
past Congress has demonstrated a preference for courts to act as the primary interpreter of 
regulatory statutes. The Administrative Procedure Act contains such a statement, and the 
Bumpers Amendment, that nearly passed Congress, favored courts over agencies in all 
circumstances. Senator Bumpers justified his proposal by arguing that courts would 
ensure greater fidelity to congressional desires, whereas agencies would follow the lead 
of the President or implement their own policy goals notwithstanding congressional 
intent.94 Although many in Congress are unlikely to share Bumpers’ preference because 
they will understand their greater influence over agencies through oversight, 
appropriations, and jawboning, the history of legislative action in this arena suggests that 
Congress would sometimes delegate to courts or restrict the delegation to agencies, 
particularly when it would have the opportunity to revisit its decision in the future. 
 
C. Limitations of the Action-Prompting Mechanism and the Need for a 
Continuing Judicial Role 
  
 Although promising, this proposal has some evident limitations. First and 
foremost is the concern that Congress would continue to evade its responsibility and 
                                                 
94 See Statement of Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) on the Introduction of S. 2408, 121 Cong. Rec. 29956, 
29957 (Sept. 24, 1975). 
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avoid express delegations notwithstanding the procedural framework. If Congress were 
silent on the delegation issue even after adopting a procedural structure to prompt a 
decision, courts might be justified in taking primary responsibility for interpreting 
regulatory statutes. Under the traditional approach that is tied to congressional intent, 
deference on the basis of delegation would seem inappropriate in such circumstances. 
Adopting such a procedure would signal that Congress hoped to provide better directives 
to courts; therefore, the absence of an express delegation would have a different meaning 
than it does now. To put it another way, if the background rule is that courts are the 
primary interpreters of ambiguous statutory text, then congressional silence could be take 
to mean that Congress had made the institutional-choice decision in favor of allowing 
courts to carry on their usual role. Alternatively, congressional silence could be 
understood as a decision by Congress to let the courts determine which institution, courts 
or agencies, should have the primary responsibility to make policy through statutory 
interpretation. In this case, courts might decide, perhaps on institutional grounds, to adopt 
and consistently apply some default rule of deference, understanding that the action-
prompting procedure in Congress would make it more likely that the legislature could 
vary the default when it wanted to. The point here is a general one: judicial doctrines 
should take account of the realities of the legislative process, and legislative process 
should be reconfigured to allow Congress a realistic opportunity to take advantage of opt-
out provisions in default rules of judicial review, whatever the content. 
 Second, the possibility that Congress might allocate law-interpreting power away 
from an agency if lawmakers decided that the agency’s performance was unacceptable 
would increase the influence of current Congresses over agencies. This in turn might 
increase the political pressures on agencies, particularly pressures related to current 
political passions. Moreover, it would increase the influence of the committees 
responsible for authorization and appropriations bills because they would make the initial 
decision about delegating law-interpreting authority, and the full House or Senate would 
be unlikely to revisit the decision in the context of deliberation on a lengthy legislative 
proposal dealing with many aspects of an agency or with many funding decisions.95 Of 
                                                 
95 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, __ 
Tex. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that oversight techniques tend to empower submajorities in 
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course, these committees already have substantial influence over agencies because of 
their oversight activities, their control over agency budgets, and other formal and 
informal tools used to influence administrators.96 Agencies routinely balance the 
demands of their competing principals—Congress and the President—within the 
structure of the regulatory program enacted by yet a third principal, a previous 
Congress.97 While my proposal might marginally increase the influence of current 
lawmakers, particularly those on oversight committees, I do not see it as significant 
enough to profoundly affect current dynamics. 
 Third, and relatedly, Congress might decide how to allocate authority between 
agencies or courts solely on political grounds. For example, a Democratic Congress, 
angry at the policies pursued by the Environmental Protection Agency under a 
conservative Republican President, might decide to punish it by instructing courts to pay 
no special attention to agency views on statutory interpretation. Of course, this objection 
is no different from accusations that can be leveled at Congress with respect to any 
delegation of regulatory authority. Political considerations are not illegitimate in this 
realm; regulatory policy should be based on a mix of technocratic issues and on political 
perspectives that take account of the wishes of the electorate. Both change over time, and 
Congress and the executive branch take account of them as they determine regulatory 
policy. 
It is not clear to me why this context poses a greater risk of inappropriate political 
power plays than other arenas. On the contrary, Congress might feel somewhat more 
constrained here for several reasons. First, if lawmakers “punished” agencies by taking 
away law-interpreting power, they would allocate that power to judges who might be less 
                                                                                                                                                 
Congress that may subvert the objectives of the full body as articulated in statutory commands); Mark 
Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 Duke L.J. 1059, 
1075-82 (2001) (discussing effect of congressional oversight when the members of oversight committees 
have outlying preferences); Jonathan T. Molot, supra note 16, at 1291 (noting that “it is far from clear that 
the policy preferences of legislative oversight committees accurately reflect the views of the House or 
Senate as a whole”). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 56, at 23 (noting that effective agencies already 
take current political developments into account when making regulatory decisions). 
96 See, e.g., Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the 
Legislative Veto (1996) (discussing the various methods of influence Congress and committees can bring 
to bear on agencies and the executive branch). See also David B. Spence, Administrative Law and 
Administrative Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 407, 
432-38 (1997) (discussing limitations of ex post methods of political control over agencies). 
97 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, supra note 95; David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, supra note 62. 
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likely to take account of current congressional preferences and who would still pay some 
attention to agency views as an extrinsic source of meaning. So the punishment might 
rebound, leaving Congress reliant on an institution that it influences less effectively than 
it does the agency and that often trusts agencies as the repositories of expertise more than 
it trusts the legislature. Second, the use of the authorization process to make the 
allocation decision would have interesting temporal effects. Re-authorizations occur 
every few years, sometimes every ten years, so lawmakers would be aware that if they 
delegated interpretive power to the courts, that decision would likely stay in place for 
some time, perhaps past the term of the President with which Congress disagreed. Of 
course, Congress could revisit its decision at any time, but the reason an action-
prompting mechanism tied to the reauthorization process is necessary is because 
Congress does not often act without some internal prod. However, the process would be 
an evolutive one. No decision would be final because it could be reassessed as the 
political environment changed, although perhaps not immediately given the timing of the 
authorization process. Thus, the authorization vehicle would decrease the chance of 
severe punishment, because the decision would have some durability, but any 
overreaction that occurred could be reassessed in a different political climate. In short, 
the charge of “political” decisionmaking is either a claim without much traction in the 
world of political actors, or a charge that is no more, and perhaps less, worrisome in this 
particular situation. 
 Even in cases where Congress delegated law-interpreting authority to an agency, 
courts would have some independent role to play. First, courts would determine the scope 
of the delegation and ensure that the agency had not exceeded its authority nor regulated 
past the jurisdiction Congress granted it.98 Deference to agency determinations of these 
issues would be inappropriate because agencies are interested parties, with incentives in 
some cases to over-reach and in some cases to evade responsibility that clearly had been 
placed on them. The court’s job would be to determine the scope of the congressional 
delegation, a task made easier with express congressional directives, not to second-guess 
the agency’s decision to regulate particular entities or to deal with problems that arguably 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 6 (“Where deference exists, the court must specify the 
boundaries of agency authority, within which the agency is authorized to fashion authoritatively part, often 
a large part, of the meaning of the statute.”). 
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come within its mandate. The issue of whether Chevron deference can be applied to 
jurisdictional questions has not been clearly settled by the Court;99 in my view, ensuring 
an independent judicial analysis to determine the scope of the delegation is vital to ensure 
that a relatively impartial entity determines the boundaries of agency authority. Applying 
this limitation would be somewhat problematic, however. It is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between a question that concerns the agency’s jurisdiction, which would merit 
independent assessment by the judiciary, and a question of applying delegated authority 
to a borderline case, in which deference to the agency’s decision would be appropriate 
either when Congress had signaled that agency views on the meaning of statutes should 
be controlling or when the judicial default rule would understand congressional silence as 
such a delegation. One way to resolve the difficulty is to require an independent judicial 
role only with respect to broad jurisdictional issues that either expand agency power 
substantially or restrict it significantly.100 
 Second, courts should require that agencies provide reasons for their decisions to 
exercise their delegated law-interpreting power in a particular way.101 Not only are 
explanations important to promote agency accountability and transparency of 
decisionmaking, but agencies should not be allowed to adopt interpretations of statutes 
that are clearly erroneous. Only by assessing the analysis that supports a particular 
interpretation of vague or ambiguous language can the courts discharge their duty under 
the Administrative Procedure Act to reject agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.”102 As long as the agency acted within 
the authority delegated to it by Congress, the court should accept any reasonable 
                                                 
99 See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989, 
992-93 (1999) (arguing for independent role for judiciary to determine jurisdictional questions and 
acknowledging that judicial practice remains unsettled); Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 446 (arguing 
that deference to agency is inappropriate in context of question “whether agency jurisdiction extends to 
new or unforeseen areas”); Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2099 (“The principal reason [for an 
independent judicial role] is that Congress would be unlikely to want agencies to have authority to decide 
on the extent of their own powers. To accord such power to agencies would be to allow them to be judges 
in their own cause, in which they are of course susceptible to bias.”). 
100 See Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2100. 
101 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 17, 26 (2001) (“The path of American administrative law has 
been the path of the progressive submission of power to reason. The promise of the administrative state was 
to bring competence to politics.”). 
102 Administrative Procedure Act, Section 706(2)(A). See also M. Elizabeth Magill, supra note 33 
(discussing similarity of judicial review at Step Two of Chevron and arbitrary and capricious review in 
other contexts). 
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interpretation supported by an explanation, but it would retain a very limited role to play 
to take care that the agency did not act irrationally or unreasonably. Perhaps the way to 
think about this sort of judicial review is to understand it as a method to detect clear 
mistakes.103 
In proposing that courts retain a limited role to police the scope of Congress’ 
delegation to agencies, to ensure reasoned explanations, and to guard against clear error, I 
am aware that courts might use any grant of power to avoid deferring to agencies and to 
retain primary law-interpreting authority. Particularly in the realm of distinguishing 
jurisdictional questions from other questions, the dividing line is blurry, and judgment 
calls are necessary. Aggressive judges could use any exception as an invitation to push 
the entire judicial camel, nose-first, into the policymaking tent. However, if Congress had 
expressly directed that agency interpretations of statutory language should be 
“controlling” or otherwise indicated that courts should defer to agencies, deference might 
actually occur more than it does now in the world of judicially-constructed rules. In 
practice, Chevron has resulted in less deference than one might have expected, and courts 
routinely find “clear” statutory meaning at Step One through aggressive use of canons 
and other interpretative methods. Although judges could still evade congressional 
directives to defer using similar techniques, they might be less likely to do so in the face 
of an explicit directive rather than because of one constructed by the courts. Particularly 
when the doctrinal justification for deference rests on congressional delegation, even the 
most aggressive judge might find ignoring a clear directive passed pursuant to a 
procedural framework problematic. Although the concern about judicial opportunism is a 
real one, it seems more problematic to deny any role to the courts, and such a course 
might well be constitutionally impermissible given Marbury and the structure of 
separated powers. 
 
                                                 
103 The role I envision for the courts here is similar to the role Thayer argued they should undertake with 
regard to constitutional review of congressional action, with the additional requirement that agencies 
provide explanations for the interpretations they select. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope 
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893). See also Henry P. 
Monaghan, supra note 5, at 13-14 (discussing Thayer’s suggestion of judicial review only for clear error 
and arguing that such a deferential standard of review might be consistent with Marbury if one separates 
the question of the existence of judicial review from its scope); Nicholas S. Zeppos, supra note 87, at 299 
(drawing analogy between Chevron deference and Thayerian review). 
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III. Conclusion 
 
 Fundamentally, Marbury v. Madison is a case about allocating power among 
institutions of governance. Thus, as we assess it at its bicentennial, we should use it as a 
springboard to consider the relationship among modern governance institutions, which 
include not only Congress and the courts, but also administrative agencies. Under current 
doctrine, informed by Marbury and administrative law precedents like Chevron, the role 
that agencies play in law-interpreting and other matters is largely left to Congress to 
determine when it delegates authority to the executive branch. In the absence of clear 
congressional directives, courts have, in the guise of constructing legislative intent, made 
the decision themselves whether to retain the power to interpret statutes or allocate it 
mainly to agencies by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations. Whether the judicial 
approach is couched in terms of congressional intent, or uses some other basis for 
allocating the power to make policy through interpretation, the judicial approaches all 
envision that Congress has continuing power to vary any judicial default rule. 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of congressional power to override the judiciary 
with respect to which institution should interpret laws, no one seriously expects Congress 
to act in most cases. We have accepted the courts’ predominant role in this area, in part 
because of low expectations with regard to legislative performance. However, a 
procedural framework could be crafted to encourage lawmakers to use regularly enacted 
legislative vehicles to provide clearer guidance to courts and agencies of their roles with 
respect to statutory interpretation. If, notwithstanding adoption of such a vehicle, 
Congress still failed to provide direction, congressional silence would have more 
meaning, although the meaning would depend on the default rule of judicial review 
adopted by courts. When Congress remains mute despite the opportunity to instruct 
clearly, some would argue that the role Marbury envisioned for the judiciary would be 
appropriate even in the context of regulatory statutes. Or courts might adopt and 
consistently apply a bright-line rule favoring agency interpretation over judicial 
interpretation, based on technocratic, democratic, or other institutional considerations. In 
that case, the action-prompting congressional procedure would allow Congress a 
meaningful opportunity to vary such a default. 
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My own preference is for the second default rule based on my assessment of the 
institutional considerations. But the point of this article is not to argue in favor of one or 
the other default rule, but to present a proposal that makes more meaningful the aspects 
of judicial review of regulatory statutes that envision a role for Congress. No matter what 
the judicial default rule, the procedural framework described here would make the 
possibility of its involvement more salient to Congress, and it would encourage the 
legislature to consider any variance of the default role in the appropriate context of 
authorization bills or, when necessary, appropriations bills. Once judicial review is 
situated in the model of a continuing process of interaction among courts, Congress, and 
agencies, we can better understand the importance of providing all these groups with the 
tools they need to communicate with and respond to the other branches. 
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